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Abstract
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the rela-
tive abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games
among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolution-
ary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency
dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found
for the Wright-Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions
specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy,
in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation
rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these
two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization
of n× n games in the limit of weak selection.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency dependent selection (May-
nard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998,
2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). The individuals of a population can adopt one
of several strategies, which can be seen as genotypes or phenotypes. The payoff for
each strategy is a linear function of the relative frequencies of all strategies. The
coefficients of this linear function are the entries of the payoff matrix. Payoff is
interpreted as fitness: individuals reproduce at rates that are proportional to their
payoff. Reproduction can be genetic or cultural.
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Evolutionary game theory provides a theoretical foundation for understanding hu-
man and animal behavior (Schelling, 1980; Maynard Smith, 1982; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991; Binmore, 1994; Aumann and Maschler, 1995; Samuelson, 1997). Ap-
plications of evolutionary game theory include games among viruses (Turner and
Chao, 1999, 2003) and bacteria (Kerr et al., 2002) as well as host-parasite inter-
actions (Nowak and May, 1994). Cellular interactions within the human body can
also be evolutionary games. As an example we mention the combat between the im-
mune system and virus infected cells (Nowak et al., 1991; May and Nowak, 1995;
Bonhoeffer and Nowak, 1995). The ubiquity of evolutionary game dynamics is not
surprising, because evolutionary game theory provides a fairly general approach to
evolutionary dynamics (Nowak, 2006). There is also an equivalence between fun-
damental equations of ecology (May, 1973) and those of evolutionary game theory
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
Let us consider a game with n strategies. The payoff values are given by the n× n
payoff matrix A = [aij]. This means that an individual using strategy i receives
payoff aij when interacting with an individual that uses strategy j. For understand-
ing a game it is useful to explore whether any of the strategies are Nash equilibria
(Nash, 1950; Maynard Smith, 1982; Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Cressman, 1992).
Strategy k is a strict Nash equilibrium if akk > aik for all i 6= k. Strategy k is a
Nash equilibrium if akk ≥ aik for all i. Another useful concept is that of an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy (ESS) (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith,
1982, 1974). Strategy k is ESS if either (i) akk > aik or (ii) akk = aik and aki > aii
holds for all i 6= k. We have the following implications: if k is a strict Nash equilib-
rium then it is an ESS; if k is an ESS then it is a Nash equilibrium. Both Nash and
ESS, however, give conditions on whether a strategy, which is played by the ma-
jority of players, outperforms all other strategies. Hence they identify the ‘favored’
strategy based on its performance at large frequencies.
The traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics uses well-mixed popu-
lations of infinite size. In this case the deterministic selection dynamics can be
described by the replicator equation, which is an ordinary differential equation de-
fined on the simplex Sn (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Weibull, 1995). Many interest-
ing properties of this equation are described in the book by Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998).
More recently there have been efforts to study evolutionary game dynamics in
populations of finite size (Riley, 1979; Schaffer, 1988; Kandori et al., 1993; Kan-
dori and Rob, 1995; Fogel et al., 1998; Ficici and Pollack, 2000; Schreiber, 2001;
Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004; Wild and Taylor, 2004; Traulsen et al.,
2005). For finite populations a stochastic description is necessary. Of particular in-
terest is the fixation probability of a strategy (Nowak et al., 2004; Antal and Scheur-
ing, 2006; Lessard and Ladret, 2007): the probability that a single mutant strategy
overtakes a homogeneous population which uses another strategy. When only two
strategies are involved, the strategy with higher fixation probability is considered
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to be more ‘favored’ by selection. We can take a game of n strategies and analyze
all pairwise fixation probabilities to find which strategies are favored by selection
(Imhof and Nowak, 2006). This concept, in some way, compares strategies at all
relative frequencies during the fixation process, as opposed to the Nash and ESS
conditions.
The study of fixation probabilities, however, is only conclusive for small mutation
rates, which means most of the time all players use the same strategy. In this paper,
we propose a more general way of identifying the strategy most favored by selec-
tion: it is the strategy with the highest average frequency in the long time average.
For brevity we call throughout this paper the average frequency of a strategy in
the stationary state its abundance. The criteria for higher abundance can be used
for arbitrary mutation rates. Moreover, for small mutation rates this criteria can be
formulated in terms of pairwise fixation probabilities.
In particular, we focus on stochastic evolutionary dynamics in populations of finite
size N , although for simplicity we shall consider the large (but still finite) popula-
tion size limit. Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent
Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004), but the Wright Fisher pro-
cess (Imhof and Nowak, 2006) and the Pairwise Comparison process (Szabo´ and
To˝ke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2007) are also discussed; the details of these processes
are explained in the next sections. In addition, we assume that individuals repro-
duce proportional to their payoffs but subject to mutation with probability u > 0.
With probability 1− u the imitator (or offspring) adopts the strategy of the teacher
(or parent); with probability u one of the n strategies is chosen at random.
We study the case of weak selection. For the frequency dependent Moran process,
the payoff of strategy i is given by fi = 1 + δpii, which is the baseline payoff,
1, plus the payoff pii of strategy i obtained in the games, weighted by the inten-
sity of selection δ ≥ 0. Weak selection means δ ≪ 1/N . In this case, although
the frequencies of the strategies can widely fluctuate in time, all strategies have
approximately the same abundance (average frequency), 1/n, in the stationary dis-
tribution of the mutation-selection process. We are interested in the deviation from
this uniform distribution. To calculate this deviation we use a perturbation theory
in the selection strength, δ. Here we follow the methods developed in Antal et al.
(2008) for studying two strategies in a phenotype space. Perturbation studies can
also be found in Rousset (2004) for subdivided populations.
In this paper we study n-strategy games in a well mixed population of N players.
We consider that selection favors a strategy if its abundance (average frequency)
exceeds 1/n. Conversely, selection opposes a strategy, if its abundance is less than
1/n. We establish the following results. For low mutation probability (u ≪ 1/N),
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we find that selection favors strategy k if
Lk =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(akk + aki − aik − aii) > 0. (1)
For high mutation probability (u≫ 1/N), selection favors strategy k if
Hk =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(akj − aij) > 0. (2)
For arbitrary mutation probability the general expression for selection to favor strat-
egy k is
Lk +NuHk > 0. (3)
Strategy k is more abundant than strategy j if
Lk +NuHk > Lj +NuHj . (4)
All these results hold for large but finite population size, 1 ≪ N ≪ 1/δ. They
allow a complete characterization of n × n games in the limit of weak selection.
The equilibrium frequencies of each strategy are also given in the paper.
We can gain some qualitative understanding of our low (1) and high (2) mutation
rate results. For low mutation rates, most of the time, all players use the same
strategy until another strategy takes over. There are only two strategies involved
in a takeover. A single k-player fixates in all i-players with a higher probability
than a single i-player into k-players, if akk + aki − aik − aii > 0 (Nowak, 2006).
For only two strategies present, a higher fixation probability for k means that it is
more abundant. Hence strategy k is the most abundant among all strategies if it
fixates well against all strategies, which then explains expression (1). Conversely,
for high mutation rates the frequencies of all strategies are close to 1/n all the
time. Hence the payoff of strategy k is roughly fk = 1 + (δ/n)
∑
j=1 akj . One has
to compare this payoff to the average payoff of the population (1/n)∑i fi, which
leads to expression (2).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we derive the general
conditions for strategy abundance for any mutation rates. Section 3 provides three
concrete examples. Possible extensions of our method to strong selection, more
general mutation rates, the Wright-Fisher and the Pairwise Comparison processes
are discussed in Section 4. We summarize our results in Section 5.
2 Perturbation method
Let us consider a well mixed population ofN players. Each of them plays one of the
n ≥ 2 strategies. The state of the system is described by the n-dimensional column
4
vector X, where Xi is the number of players using strategy i. The frequencies of
strategies are x = X/N . The payoff matrix is given by the n× n matrix A = [aij ],
where aij is the payoff of an i-player playing against a j-player. The payoff of an
individual using strategy i is fi, and the column vector f is given by f = 1+ δAx.
Here δ ≥ 0 is the selection strength, and 1i = 1 (for all i) is the baseline payoff.
The term AX/N = Ax in the player’s payoff stands for the average contribution
from all other players through the game. We included self interaction here, since
it does not make a difference in the large N limit. The total payoff of the whole
population is F = XT f = N(1 + δxTAx). We assume weak selection throughout
this paper, by which we mean that δN ≪ 1. The need for such weak selection (as
opposed to δ ≪ 1) shall become clear at the end of this section.
The dynamics of the system is given by the frequency dependent Moran process. In
each time step a randomly chosen individual is replaced by a copy of an individual
chosen with probability proportional to its payoff. The offspring inherits the par-
ent’s strategy with probability 1 − u, or adopts a random strategy with probability
u > 0.
We shall show below that the condition for strategy k to be more abundant than
the average 1/n is equivalent to having a positive average change of its frequency
during a single update step. Hence we start deriving this latter quantity. In state X,
the average number of offspring (fitness) of a k-player due to selection is ωk =
1− 1/N + fk/F . We also included the parent among the offspring, which explains
the leading 1 on the right hand side. The term −1/N describes its random death,
while the term fk/F stands for the proliferation proportional to payoff. For δ → 0,
the fitness can be written as
ωk = 1 + δN
−1[(Ax)k − x
T
Ax] +O(δ2N−1), (5)
In one update step, the frequency of k-players changes on average due to selection
by
∆xselk = xkωk − xk = δ∆x
(1)
k [1 +O(δ)], (6)
where the first derivative with respect to δ is
∆x
(1)
k = N
−1xk[(Ax)k − x
T
Ax]. (7)
The state of the system, X, changes over time due to selection and mutation. In the
stationary state of the Moran process we find the system in state X with probability
Pδ(X). This stationary probability distribution is the eigenvector with the largest
eigenvalue of the stochastic transition matrix of the system (van Kampen, 1997).
The elements of the transition matrix depend on δ only through f = 1 + O(δ).
Note that there is no N dependence in the correction term, since both A and x
are independent of N . Consequently, the stationary probabilities are continuous at
δ = 0, and we can write them as Pδ(X) = Pδ=0(X)[1 + O(δ)] for any state X.
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Hence by averaging ∆xselk in the stationary state, in the leading order in δ we obtain
〈∆xselk 〉δ ≡
∑
X
∆xselk Pδ(X) = δ
∑
X
∆x
(1)
k Pδ=0(X)× [1 +O(δ)]. (8)
Thus, we can describe the stationary state of the system for small δ by using the
stationary distribution in the absence of selection, δ = 0. Since the correction term
is independent of N , the above formula remains valid even in the large population
size limit. Using expression (7) for ∆x(1)k , the average change due to selection in
the leading order can be written as
〈∆xselk 〉δ = δN
−1〈xk[(Ax)k − x
T
Ax]〉
= δN−1
(∑
j
akj〈xkxj〉 −
∑
i,j
aij〈xkxixj〉
)
,
(9)
where 〈·〉 denotes the average in the neutral stationary state (δ = 0).
So far we have only considered selection. By taking into account mutation as well,
the expected total change of frequency in state X during one update step can be
written as
∆xtotk = ∆x
sel
k (1− u) +
u
N
(
1
n
− xk
)
. (10)
The first term on the right hand side describes the change in the absence of muta-
tion, which happens with probability 1− u. The second term stands for the change
due to mutation, which happens with probability u. In this latter case the frequency
xk increases by 1/nN due to the introduction of a random type, and decreases
by xk/N due to random death. In the stationary state the average total change of
the frequency is zero, 〈∆xtotk 〉δ = 0, that is selection and mutation are in balance.
Hence by averaging (10) we obtain the abundance (average frequency) in the sta-
tionary state expressed by the average change due to selection as
〈xk〉δ =
1
n
+N
1− u
u
〈∆xselk 〉δ . (11)
We emphasize that this relationship is valid at any intensity of selection, although
we are going to use it only in the weak selection limit. From (11) it follows that the
condition 〈xk〉δ > 1/n is in fact equivalent to
〈∆xselk 〉δ > 0 . (12)
That is, for strategy k to be more abundant than the average, the change due to
selection must be positive in the stationary state. Hence, as we claimed, instead of
computing the mean frequency, we can now concentrate on the average change (9)
during a single update step.
To evaluate (9) we need to calculate averages of the form 〈xkxj〉 and 〈xkxixj〉.
Since in the neutral stationary state all players are equivalent, exchanging indexes
does not affect the averages. For example 〈x1x1〉 = 〈x3x3〉, and 〈x1x2x2〉 =
6
〈x1x3x3〉. By taking into account these symmetries, only six different averages ap-
pear in (9)
〈x1〉 = 〈xi〉
〈x1x1〉 = 〈xixi〉
〈x1x2〉 = 〈xixj〉
〈x1x1x1〉 = 〈xixixi〉
〈x1x2x2〉 = 〈xixjxj〉
〈x1x2x3〉 = 〈xixjxk〉
(13)
for all k 6= i 6= j 6= k. Equation (9) then takes the form
Nδ−1〈∆xselk 〉δ = 〈x1x1〉akk + 〈x1x2〉
∑
i,i 6=k
aki − 〈x1x1x1〉akk
− 〈x1x2x2〉
∑
i,i 6=k
(aki + aii + aik)− 〈x1x2x3〉
∑
i,j
k 6=i 6=j 6=k
aij .
(14)
Note that 〈x1x2x3〉 is not defined for n = 2, but in that case the last sum in (14) is
zero anyway. Hence the following derivation is valid even for n = 2. By removing
the restrictions from the summations in (14), we can rearrange this expression into
Nδ−1〈∆xselk 〉δ = akk
(
〈x1x1〉 − 〈x1x2〉 − 〈x1x1x1〉+ 3〈x1x2x2〉 − 2〈x1x2x3〉
)
+ 〈x1x2〉
∑
i
aki +
(
〈x1x2x3〉 − 〈x1x2x2〉
)∑
i
(aki + aii + aik)
− 〈x1x2x3〉
∑
i,j
aij .
(15)
Let us now interpret these average quantities. We draw j players at random from
the population in the neutral stationary state, and define sj as the probability that
all of them have the same strategy. We have 〈x1〉 = n−1 because under neutrality
a player has 1/n chance of having strategy one out of n possibilities. Moreover,
we have 〈x1x1〉 = s2n−1, because the first player has strategy one with probability
1/n and the second player uses the same strategy with probability s2. Similarly
〈x1x1x1〉 = s3n
−1 holds. The remaining averages that appear in (15) can be written
as
〈x1x2〉 = 〈(1−
∑
2≤i≤n
xi)x2〉 = 〈x1〉 − 〈x1x1〉 − (n− 2)〈x1x2〉
〈x1x2x2〉 = 〈(1−
∑
2≤i≤n
xi)x2x2〉 = 〈x1x1〉 − 〈x1x1x1〉 − (n− 2)〈x1x2x2〉
〈x1x2x3〉 = 〈(1−
∑
2≤i≤n
xi)x2x3〉 = 〈x1x2〉 − 2〈x1x2x2〉 − (n− 3)〈x1x2x3〉
where we used the normalization condition ∑i xi = 1, and the symmetry relations
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(13). Thus, we can express all the averages in (13) in terms of only two probabili-
ties, s2 and s3
〈x1〉 =
1
n
〈x1x1〉 =
s2
n
〈x1x2〉 =
1− s2
n(n− 1)
〈x1x1x1〉 =
s3
n
〈x1x2x2〉 =
s2 − s3
n(n− 1)
〈x1x2x3〉 =
1− 3s2 + 2s3
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
.
(16)
We note again that for n = 2 the last expression is ill defined, but it is not needed
in that case.
Up to this point everything was calculated for finite N . Although further discussion
for finiteN is possible, it becomes quite unwieldy; hence for simplicity we consider
only the large N limit from here on. In Appendix A we calculate the values of s2
and s3 for N ≫ 1, which are given by (A.3) and (A.7), respectively. By substituting
these expressions into (16) we arrive at
〈x1x1〉 = n(2 + µ)(n+ µ)C
〈x1x2〉 = µ(2 + µ)nC
〈x1x1x1〉 = (n+ µ)(2n+ µ)C
〈x1x2x2〉 = µ(n+ µ)C
〈x1x2x3〉 = µ
2C ,
(17)
where C = [Nn3(1+µ)(2+µ)]−1 and µ = Nu is the rescaled mutation rate. With
these correlations, (15) takes the form
〈∆xselk 〉δ
Cδ
= µn2akk + µ(2 + µ)n
∑
i
aki − µn
∑
i
(aki + aii + aik)− µ
2
∑
i,j
aij ,
where rearranging the terms leads to
〈∆xselk 〉δ
Cδ
= µ2
(
n
∑
i
aki −
∑
i,j
aij
)
+ µn
∑
i
(akk + aki − aik − aii).
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By defining
Lk =
1
n
∑
i
(akk + aki − aik − aii)
Hk =
1
n2
∑
i,j
(aki − aij),
(18)
we finally arrive at our main result
〈∆xselk 〉δ =
δµ (Lk + µHk)
nN(1 + µ)(2 + µ)
. (19)
This expression is valid in the limit of large population size N ≫ 1, for weak
selection Nδ ≪ 1, with µ = Nu being constant. Condition (12) for strategy k to
be more abundant than the average 1/n is simply Lk + µHk > 0 as we already
announced in (3). In the low mutation limit (µ → 0) the condition for abundance
becomes Lk > 0, while in the high mutation limit (µ → ∞) it is Hk > 0. As a
consequence of (11), strategy k is more abundant than strategy j ifLk+µHk > Lj+
µHj . Note that any finite mutation probability u corresponds to the high mutation
rate limit µ→∞ for our N →∞ limit.
By substituting (19) into (11) we obtain the abundances (average frequencies) in
the weak selection stationary state
〈xk〉δ =
1
n
[
1 + δN(1 − u)
Lk +NuHk
(1 +Nu)(2 +Nu)
]
. (20)
This expression becomes exact in the N → ∞, Nδ → 0 limit, if Nu = µ is kept
constant. It becomes clear at this point, that although we only used δ ≪ 1 to derive
(19), we actually need δN ≪ 1 to have frequencies close to 1/n in (20).
2.1 Special case: Two strategies
For only two strategies (n = 2) the general formula (19) leads to
〈∆xsel1 〉δ =
δu
8(1 +Nu)
(a11 + a12 − a21 − a22). (21)
The peculiarity of the two strategy case is that the condition for higher abundance
(mean frequency) (12) of strategy one
a11 + a12 − a21 − a22 > 0 (22)
does not depend on the mutation probability u. It has been shown in (Antal et al.,
2009) that very similar conditions hold for finite population size. With self interac-
tion we obtain the same result, but when self interaction is excluded, the condition
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becomes
(a11 + a12 − a21 − a22)N − 2a11 + 2a22 > 0 (23)
This condition does not depend on the mutation probability u either. Moreover, the
above conditions are also valid for arbitrary strength of selection for a general class
of models, in particular for the Moran model with exponential payoff functions
or for the Pairwise Comparison process (Antal et al., 2009). Note that this law is
well known for several models in the low mutation rate limit (Kandori et al., 1993;
Nowak et al., 2004).
2.2 Low mutation rates
There is an intimate relationship between our conditions for high abundance and
fixation probabilities for low mutation rates µ ≪ 1. In this limit, most of the time
all players follow the same strategy, and rarely a single mutant takes over the entire
homogeneous population (fixates). During fixation only two types of players are
present. The fixation probability ρij is the probability that a single i-player over-
takes a population of j-players. Hence we have effectively n states of pure strate-
gies, where a state of pure strategy j changes to a state of pure strategy i at rate
µρij/n.
Let us first consider n = 2 strategy games, where we label the two strategies as k
and i. In the stationary state there are rare transitions between pure k-player and
pure i-player states, and 〈xk〉ρik = 〈xi〉ρki with 〈xk〉 + 〈xi〉 = 1. Hence we can
write
〈xk〉 =
1
2
[
1 +
N
2
(ρki − ρik)
]
(24)
since all fixation probabilities are 1/N in the leading order of δ. On the other hand,
the abundance (20) for two strategies and low mutations becomes
〈xk〉 =
1
2
(
1 +
N
2
δLk
)
(25)
Consequently, we can express δLk as
δ
2
(akk + aki − aik − aii) = ρki − ρik. (26)
This equality can also be derived independently from the exact expression of the
fixation probability (Nowak et al., 2004)
ρki =
1
N
[
1 +
δN
6
(akk + 2aki − aik − 2aii)
]
(27)
For n strategies, by using (1) and (26), we can express Lk with pairwise fixation
probabilities as Lk = (2/δn)
∑
i ρki − ρik. The condition Lk > 0 for strategy k to
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be more abundant than 1/n can be written as
∑
i
ρki >
∑
i
ρik (28)
This condition can be interpreted as follows: strategy k is more abundant than 1/n
in the low mutation rate limit if the average fixation probability of a single k-player
into other pure strategy states is larger than the average fixation probability of other
strategies into a pure strategy k population. For these averages we take all strategies
with the same weights.
3 Examples
Here we provide three applications of our results for three strategy games. First in
3.1 we study the effect of Loners on Cooperators and Defectors. Then in 3.2 we
show how mutation alone can make a strategy more abundant. Finally in 3.3 we
study the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
3.1 Cooperators, Defectors, Loners
To see the difference between our weak selection and a traditional game-theoretic
approach, let us consider the following example. We start with a Prisoner Dilemma
game between cooperators (C) and defectors (D), given by the payoff matrix
( C D
C 10 1
D 11 2
)
. (29)
Clearly, defectors dominate cooperators, so we expect that defectors are more abun-
dant in a stationary state. Indeed, from condition (22) we obtain
a11 + a12 − a21 − a22 = −2 < 0. (30)
Thus strategy D is more abundant than C for any mutation rate.
Surprisingly, the introduction of loners (L), which do not participate in the game
(Hauert et al., 2002), can dramatically change the balance between C and D. Con-
sider the following game:


C D L
C 10 1 0
D 11 2 0
L 0 0 0

. (31)
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Loners are dominated by cooperators and defectors. Elimination of the dominated
strategyL leads to a game between C andD, in whichD is winning. Thus, standard
game theoretic arguments predict that strategy D is the most abundant. However,
these arguments fail for weak selection, where it is not enough to know that a
strategy dominates another, but also how strong this dominance is. In pairwise in-
teractions, the advantage of C over L is significantly larger than that ofD over L as
can be seen from the matrices:
( C L
C 10 0
L 0 0
) (D L
D 2 0
L 0 0
)
. (32)
This advantage of C can overcompensate the disadvantage it has against D, there-
fore the abundance of C can be the highest.
Indeed, the relevant quantities for low mutation rates are
LC =
8
3
, LD =
4
3
, and LL = −4. (33)
Thus, both C and D have larger abundance than the neutral value 1/3. But since
LC > LD, strategy C has the highest abundance. The introduction of loners causes
the reversal of abundance between C and D when the mutation rates are small. In
other words we can say the loners favor cooperators.
For high mutation rates the relevant quantities are
HC = 1, HD =
5
3
, and HL = −
8
3
. (34)
Hence, according to (3), both C and D have an abundance larger than 1/3 for any
mutation rate. For high mutation rates, however, since HC < HD, strategy D be-
comes the most abundant. In fact, C is the most abundant for µ < µ∗ ≡ 2, but it is
D for µ > µ∗.
3.2 Reversing the ranking of strategies by mutation
As a second example, we address the game


S1 S2 S3
S1 1 0 13
S2 0 λ 8
S3 0 7 9

, (35)
where λ is a free parameter. For λ < 7, S2 is dominated by S3. Moreover, S1
dominates S3, and S1 and S2 are bistable. Thus, classical game theoretic analysis
12
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Fig. 1. Strategy abundance (mean frequency) in the game given by the payoff matrix (35).
Colored lines show the critical conditions under which one of the three strategies exceeds
an abundance of 1/3. For small mutation rates, S1 is favored over S3, but for large mutation
rate, S3 is favored over S1. All three strategies have equal abundance at the intersection of
all boundaries.
shows that for λ < 7, all players should choose S1. It turns out that this state is also
the only stable fixed point of the replicator equation for λ < 7.
However, the above reasoning does not apply for weak selection. The relevant quan-
tities for low mutation rates are
L1 =
6− λ
3
, L2 =
2λ− 9
3
, and L3 =
3− λ
3
, (36)
and for high mutation rates they are
H1 =
4− λ
9
, H2 =
2λ− 14
9
, and H3 =
10− λ
9
. (37)
Thus, we expect thresholds where the abundance of a strategy crosses 1/3 at λ = 3,
λ = 4.5, and λ = 6 for small mutation rates and at λ = 4, λ = 7, and λ = 10
for high mutation rates. For each mutation rate and each value of λ, our conditions
determine the order of strategies. Fig. 1 shows the change of these thresholds with
the mutation rate. There are six possibilities for ordering of these three strategies. In
each of these cases, there can be one or two strategies with an abundance larger than
1/3. Therefore, there are 12 ways for ordering the strategies relative to 1/3. In this
concrete example, all of these 12 regions can be obtained by varying the parameter
λ and the mutation rate µ. For example if we fix λ = 4.6, just by changing the
rescaled mutation rate, we obtain six different orderings of the strategies relative to
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for strategy abundances as a function of the rescaled mutation
rate µ = Nu in the game of payoff matrix (35), at λ = 4.6. The population size is N = 30
and the selection strength is δ = 0.003, which means Nδ = 0.09. The solid lines are the
theoretical curves given by (20), and the dotted line marks the average abundance 1/3. The
intersections of the lines are located at the critical values given by (3) and (4). The highest
possible value of the mutation rate at this system size is µ = 30, which corresponds to
mutation probability u = 1, where all densities are equal.
1/3, as one can see in Fig. 1.
In order to verify our results we performed simulations of the Moran model with the
payoff matrix (35), at λ = 4.6. In figure 2, we compare the simulated frequencies
of strategies to the theoretical frequencies given by (20). The theory becomes exact
in the N →∞, Nδ → 0, and µ = Nu constant limit. As shown in figure 2, already
at N = 30, and δ = 0.003, which corresponds to Nδ = 0.09, we find an excellent
agreement with the theory.
3.3 Cooperators, Defectors, and Tit-for-Tat
As a third example, we discuss the interaction of ‘always cooperate’ (AllC), ‘al-
ways defect’ (AllD), and ‘tit-for-tat’ (TFT) strategies in the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (Nowak and Sigmund, 1989; Imhof et al., 2005). Each pair of play-
ers plays m ≥ 2 rounds. TFT follows its opponent strategy in the previous round,
but cooperates in the first round. Acting as a cooperator costs c for a player, but one
TFT
AllDAllC
b
c
=
m + 1
m− 1
b
c
=
3m + 1
m− 1
b
c
=
2m + 1
m− 1
b
c
=
5m + 1
m− 1
TFT
AllDAllC
b
c
=
m + 2
m− 1
b
c
=
5m + 1
2(m− 1)
b
c
=
2m + 1
m− 1
b
c
=
3m
m− 1
b
c
=
4m− 1
m− 1
(a) Low mutation rates (b) High mutation rates
Fig. 3. Strategy abundance in the interaction between AllC, AllD, and TFT in the probabil-
ity simplex S3. Dark areas are inaccessible to the evolutionary dynamics. Red lines show
thresholds where a strategy abundance crosses 1/3, the thresholds are given in terms of
b/c. Blue lines depict thresholds where two strategy abundances are identical. (a) For small
mutation rates, the abundance of AllC is never above 1/3 and it is never greater than the
abundance of TFT. (b) For high mutation rates, the abundance of AllC is above 1/3 in the
yellow shaded area, but again it never exceeds the abundance of TFT.
gets benefit b from playing with a cooperator. Hence, the payoff matrix is given by


AllC AllD TFT
AllC (b− c)m −cm (b− c)m
AllD bm 0 b
TFT (b− c)m −c (b− c)m

. (38)
For low mutation rates, the relevant quantities are
LAllC = −
2cm
3
LAllD =
−b(m− 1) + c(3m+ 1)
3
LTFT =
b(m− 1)− c(m+ 1)
3
.
(39)
The most apparent consequence is that for low mutation rates cooperators never
exceed the abundance of 1/3. This is not surprising, since AllC is a fairly dull
strategy: the mean AllD and the cleverer TFT is expected to perform better. As
we increase the benefit to cost ratio b/c, the order of abundance of these strategies
change at several particular values. For b
c
< m+1
m−1
, only the abundance of AllD is
larger than 1/3. For m+1
m−1
< b
c
< 2m+1
m−1
, the abundance of both AllD and TFT is
above 1/3, with AllD still dominating TFT. For b
c
> 2m+1
m−1
TFT becomes more
abundant than AllD, for b
c
> 3m+1
m−1
the abundance of AllD drops below 1/3, and for
b
c
> 5m+1
m−1
, it is even smaller than the abundance of AllC.
15
For high mutation rates, the relevant quantities are
HAllC =
b(m− 1)− c(4m− 1)
9
HAllD =
−2b(m− 1) + c(5m+ 1)
9
HTFT =
b(m− 1)− c(m+ 2)
9
.
(40)
Surprisingly, now the abundance of AllC can exceed 1/3 for high mutation rates.
Again, as we increase the benefit to cost ratio b/c, the abundances change order at
particular b/c values, which values are different for the high and low mutation rate
limits. For high mutation rates, when b
c
< m+2
m−1
, only the abundance of AllD exceeds
1/3. For m+2
m−1
< b
c
< 2m+1
m−1
, also the abundance of TFT is larger than 1/3, but does
not exceed the abundance of AllD. For 2m+1
m−1
< b
c
< 5m+1
2(m−1)
, AllD is less abundant
than TFT. At b
c
= 5m+1
2(m−1)
, the abundance of AllD drops below 1/3 and it becomes
identical to the abundance of AllC at b
c
= 3m
m−1
. Finally, for b
c
> 4m−1
m−1
, even the
abundance of AllC exceeds 1/3, but it always remains below the abundance of
TFT. The relations between the strategies and these thresholds are depicted in Fig.
3.
The most interesting region is b
c
> 4m−1
m−1
, where the abundance of AllC exceeds
1/3 (the yellow region in Fig 3b). This is not possible for low mutation rates. High
mutation rates and the TFT strategy can facilitate AllC to increase its abundance
above average.
4 Outlook
In this section we discuss possible extensions and limitations of our method. First
in 4.1 we address the strong selection limit. Then in 4.2 we consider more general
mutation rates. Finally in 4.3 two alternative dynamics are studied.
4.1 Strong selection
Can we say something without the weak selection assumption? As we mentioned
in Section 2.2, for only two strategies condition (19) is valid for any intensity of
selection in a wide class of models (Antal et al., 2009). We can also argue that our
condition (2) is valid for very high mutation probabilities, namely for u → 1, for
arbitrary strength of selection. In this case players pick random strategies most of
the time, hence the frequencies of all strategies are close to 1/n. This implies that
the payoff of a k-player is approximately fk = (1/n)
∑
i aki, while the total payoff
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of the whole population is F = (1/n)2∑i,j aij . Strategy k performs better than
average when fk > F , which is indeed our general condition for large mutation
rates (2). Since the system is almost neutral due to high mutation, we hardly need to
assume anything about the dynamics. Note that u→ 1 implies a stronger mutation
rate than µ → ∞, since the latter corresponds to any fixed mutation probability u
in the N →∞ limit.
The situation is more complex in the low mutation rate limit for arbitrary strength
of selection. If the mutation rate is sufficiently small we can assume that there are at
most two strategies present in the system at any given time (Fudenberg and Imhof,
2006). Then we can use the fixation probabilities, or their large N asymptotic val-
ues (Antal and Scheuring, 2006; Traulsen et al., 2006), and describe the system
effectively as a Markov process on n homogeneous strategy states. This descrip-
tion, however, can lead to very different conditions for arbitrary selection and for
weak selection. Note also that if two strategies j and k tend to coexist, ajj < akj
and ajk > akk, the time spent in the mixed strategy state is exponentially large in N
(Antal and Scheuring, 2006). Hence in this case, the effective Markov process de-
scription is only valid for extremely small mutation probabilities u≪ e−λN , where
λ is a constant.
4.2 More general mutation rates
Throughout this paper we have considered uniform mutations: each strategy mu-
tates with the same probability u to a random strategy. In this section we extend
our method to a more general class of mutation rates. For uniform mutation rates
strategies have equal abundances in the absence of selection, and we have studied
the effect of selection on this uniform distribution. Conversely, for non-uniform
mutation rates strategies typically have different abundances already in the absence
of selection. It can be still of interest to study whether selection increases or de-
creases these neutral abundances. In principle the perturbation theory presented in
this paper can be repeated for general mutation probabilities, the discussion how-
ever becomes unwieldy.
Here we present an easy generalization to a specific class of mutation rates. Imagine
that each player mutates with probability u, but instead of uniformly adopting a new
strategy, it adopts strategy j with probability pj > 0. We can approximate these
probabilities (up to arbitrary precision) by rational numbers pj = mj/M , with
M =
∑
imi, and all mj ≥ 1. Then instead of our n-strategy game, we consider an
M-strategy game, where each original strategy j is represented mj times. Instead
of the n × n payoff matrix, it is straightforward to construct the M ×M payoff
matrix, with which all our formulas (1), (2) or (3) automatically apply.
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4.3 Alternative processes
Although we have focused on the Moran model in this paper, the results are almost
identical for the Wright-Fisher (W-F) process and for the Pairwise Comparison pro-
cess. In the W-F model, each player of a new (non-overlapping) generation chooses
a parent from the previous generation with probability (abbreviated as w.p.) propor-
tional to the parent’s payoff. The offspring inherits the parent’s strategy w.p. 1− u,
or adopts a random strategy w.p. u.
The expected number of offspring of a k-player in the next generation due to se-
lection is ωk = Nfk/F , in a given state. In the weak selection limit δ → 0 it
becomes
ωk = 1 + δ[(Ax)k − x
T
Ax]. (41)
This is the same as the analog expression (5) for the Moran process, apart from
the extra N factor. That N factor is due to the definition of time: time is measured
in single player update steps in the Moran model, while in generations in the W-F
model. For the neutral correlations, the only difference between the two models
in the large N limit is that in the W-F model both linages can have mutations in
each step. Hence all the neutral correlations s2 and s3 are the same as in the Moran
model of appendix A, provided we use µ = 2Nu. Consequently, 〈∆xselk 〉δ becomes
N times larger than for the Moran process (19), and µ = 2Nu.
Taking into account mutations as well, the expected total change of frequency in
one generation is
∆xtotk = ∆x
sel
k (1− u) + u
(
1
n
− xk
)
, (42)
similarly to (10). Hence the average frequency of k-players in the stationary state
is
〈xk〉δ =
1
n
+
1− u
u
〈∆xselk 〉δ , (43)
which is identical to (11) apart from an extra N factor. Since we also have an extra
N factor in 〈∆xselk 〉δ for the W-F process, these factors cancel out, and we obtain
the same stationary density (20) as for the Moran process but with 2Nu instead of
Nu (similarly to Antal et al. (2008)). This also implies that the condition for greater
abundance (3) becomes Lk + 2NuHk > 0.
Conversely, the results are identical for the Moran and the Pairwise Comparison
process. In this latter model we pick randomly a pair of players, say a type j and a
type k. The j-player then adopts strategy k w.p. F(fj− fk), otherwise the k-player
adopts strategy j. Here F(y) = [1 + eδy ]−1 is the Fermi function, and the fitnesses
are defined as f = Ax. The above comparison of the pair of players takes place
w.p. 1− u. Instead, w.p. u one of them adopts a random strategy.
Let us calculate directly the change of the frequency of k-players due to selection
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∆xselk in state X. The number of k-players changes if we pick a k-player and a
j 6= k player, which happens w.p. 2xkxj . Then the frequency xk increases by 1/N
w.p. F(fj − fk), and decreases by 1/N w.p. F(fk − fj). This leads to
∆xselk =
2xk
N
∑
j 6=k
xj [F(fj − fk)−F(fk − fj)] (44)
which, in the leading order of small δ, becomes
∆xselk =
δxk
N
∑
j 6=k
xj(fk − fj) =
δxk
N
(fk −
∑
j
xjfj). (45)
With the above definition of fitness we arrive at the same expression we obtained
for the Moran process (6) and (7). Since without selection this model is equivalent
to the Moran model, all neutral correlations s2 and s3 are also the same. Mutations
in this model have the same effect as in the Moran model (10). Consequently all
results we obtained for the Moran model are valid for the Pairwise Comparison
process as well.
5 Discussion
We have studied evolutionary game dynamics in well-mixed populations with n
strategies. We derive simple linear conditions which hold for the limit of weak
selection but for any mutation rate. These conditions specify whether a strategy
is more or less abundant than 1/n in the mutation-selection equilibrium. In the
absence of selection, the equilibrium abundance of each strategy is 1/n. An abun-
dance greater than 1/n means that selection favors this strategy. An abundance less
than 1/n means that selection opposes this strategy. We find that selection favors
strategy k if Lk + NuHk > 0, where Lk and Hk are linear functions of the payoff
values given by eqs (1) and (2). The population size is given by N and the mutation
probability by u. Furthermore, if Lk +NuHk > Lj +NuHj then the equilibrium
abundance of strategy k is greater than that of strategy j. In this case, selection
favors strategy k over j.
The traditional approach to study deterministic game dynamics in large populations
is based on the replicator equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), which describes
selection dynamics of the average frequencies of strategies. (Note the formal sim-
ilarity between (7) and the replicator equation). This method, however, neglects
fluctuations around the averages. In this paper we have taken into account stochas-
tic fluctuations, and derived exact results in the limit of weak selection. We find
the average frequencies of strategies in the stationary state, and conditions for a
strategy to be more abundant than another strategy. Our conditions are valid for
arbitrary values of the mutation rates. For small mutation rates these conditions
describe which strategy has higher fixation probability (Nowak et al., 2004).
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Throughout the paper we have considered large population size, N , in order to
simplify the presentation. But in principle all calculations can be performed for any
given population size N and mutation probability u (see for example Antal et al.
(2008)). The mutation probability is a parameter between 0 and 1. In a social con-
text, mutation can also mean ‘exploration’: people explore the strategy space by
experimenting with new strategies (Traulsen et al., 2009). A high mutation proba-
bility seems to be appropriate for social evolutionary dynamics. Our conditions can
be applied for the initial analysis of any evolutionary game that is specified by an
n× n payoff matrix.
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A Probabilities s2 and s3
This section is valid for any number n ≥ 1 of strategies. We calculate the probabil-
ities s2 and s3 in the neutral (δ = 0) stationary state. First consider the simpler s2,
that is the probability that two randomly chosen players have the same strategy. We
shall use the Moran model and apply coalescent ideas (Kingman, 1982a,b, 2000;
Wakeley, 2008; Haubold and Wiehe, 2006; Antal et al., 2008). Coalescence means
that different family lines collide in the past. A key fact behind this idea is that
there is always a common ancestor of multiple individuals in finite populations. In
the absence of mutations, any two players have the same strategy in the station-
ary state, because they both inherit their strategy from their common ancestor. In
the presence of mutations, two players may have different strategies due to muta-
tions after the branching of their ancestral lineage. Therefore, tracing the lineage of
two players backward in time and finding the most recent common ancestor, from
which two family lines branch, enable us to estimate the similarity of two players
in strategies.
Consider two different individuals and let us trace their lineages backward in time.
In the neutral Moran process, two lineages coalesce in an elementary step of update
(i.e. two players share the same parent) with probability 2/N2. Here and thereafter
we assume that the population size is large, hence we can use a continuous time
description, where the rescaled time is τ = t/(N2/2). In the rescaled time, the tra-
jectories of two players coalesce at rate 1. Following the trajectory of an individual
back in time, we see that mutations happen at rate µ/2 = Nu/2 to each trajectory.
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The coalescence time τ2 is described by the density function
f2(τ2) = e
−τ2 . (A.1)
Immediately after the coalescence of two players we have two players of the same
strategy. What is the probability s2(τ) that after a fixed time τ they have again the
same strategy? With probability (abbreviated as w.p.) e−µτ none of them mutated,
so they still have the same strategy. Otherwise at least one of them mutated, hence
they have the same strategy w.p. 1/n. The sum of these two probabilities gives
s2(τ) = e
−µτ +
1− e−µτ
n
. (A.2)
Now we obtain the stationary probability s2 by integrating this expression with the
coalescent time density of (A.1) as
s2 =
∫ ∞
0
s2(τ)f2(τ)dτ =
n + µ
n(1 + µ)
. (A.3)
Next we calculate the probability s3 that three randomly chosen players have the
same strategy. Any two trajectories of three players coalesce at rate 1, hence there
is a coalescence at rate 3. The coalescence of two out of the three trajectories then
happens at time τ3, described by the density function
f3(τ3) = 3e
−3τ3 . (A.4)
The remaining two trajectories then coalesce at time τ2 earlier, with density func-
tion (A.1). Before the first coalescence at time τ3 backward, the two players have
the same strategy w.p. s2, and of course they are different w.p. 1 − s2, where s2 is
given by (A.3). Hence just after this coalescence event we have either three iden-
tical players w.p. s2, or two identical and one different player otherwise. Now we
shall see what happens in these two scenarios.
If we have three identical players then they are also identical after time τ w.p.
s∗3(τ) =
1
n2
[
1 + 3(n− 1)e−µτ + (n− 1)(n− 2)e−
3
2
µτ
]
. (A.5)
To derive this expression note that w.p. e− 32µτ none of the players have mutated,
hence they have the same strategy. Then w.p. 3(1 − e−µ2 τ )e−µτ one of them has
mutated, hence they are the same w.p. 1/n. Otherwise at least two of them mutated
hence they are the same w.p. 1/n2. By collecting these terms one obtains (A.5).
Similarly, if after the first coalescence only two players share the same strategy and
one has a different strategy, the probability of all three having the same strategy
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after time τ is
s∗∗3 (τ) =
1
n2
[
1 + (n− 3)e−µτ − (n− 2)e−
3
2
µτ
]
. (A.6)
Now we can simply obtain s3 by first integrating over the coalescent time distribu-
tion (A.4) for the two different initial conditions, and then weighting them with the
probabilities of the initial conditions, namely
s3 = s2
∫ ∞
0
s∗3(τ)f3(τ)dτ + (1− s2)
∫ ∞
0
s∗∗3 (τ)f3(τ)dτ =
(n+ µ)(2n+ µ)
n2(1 + µ)(2 + µ)
.
(A.7)
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